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hardwired and independent of the
environment and how much they
are dependent on incoming
information. Infants are
sophisticated learners and it
seems that, in language and
music, their perceptual abilities
are driven by innate mechanisms
and learning by experience [8]. In
both domains their learning is
driven by the ability to extract
statistical regularity from stimuli.
Their responses to strings of
words and sounds depend on the
probability that one element of a
string will follow another based on
previous experience. In other
words, it seems that the infants
are making statistical inferences
regarding the external world.
What we now need to know is the
extent to which the algorithms for
extracting these regularities and
building predictions are similar or
even shared at some stages of
development across domains
such as music and language.
The issue is a deep one: We
make predictions about visual
objects, about others’ emotional
responses, about speech, music
and the movement of objects in
the world. The ground has shifted,
then, from thinking about
hardwired knowledge to thinking
about hardwired ways of
acquiring knowledge. Whether
adults can recapture the early
power of these learning
mechanisms or whether more
developed mechanisms can be
adapted to learn things in different
ways is also a question opened by
this line of work.
What of the adults in Hannon
and Trehub’s experiment [7]?
Would they have learned like the
12 month olds if they just had
more time, or had they missed a
critical time window after which
they could not use the same
learning mechanism? Again a
halfway house might be the right
place to stop: it may not be that
the window is slammed shut, but
that the adults continue to use
predictive learning mechanisms
only on a different, usually less
rich and more fixed body of neural
representations than are available
to children. Adults can learn, of
course, but they have to
overcome the limitations set by
their early experience and
subsequent neural sensitivities.
Balkan dance classes are now
open for enrolment.
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Human language exhibits many
unique features compared with
the communication systems of
other animals. The most obvious
of these is its expressive power
— the grammatical structure of
language permits an infinite
number of meaningful utterances
[1]. Language behavior depends
on the ability to model the mental
states of conspecifics [2]. And the
ability to produce and process
speech involves specialized oro-
facial, respiratory and perceptual
abilities [3]. But these potentially
unique features are also
supported by capacities that
show continuities with other
species. For example, members
of some species partition
continuous acoustic variation
categorically, exhibit lateralization
in perceptual processing, require
auditory feedback to learn
species-specific vocalizations,
engage in timed vocal
interactions, vary call production
depending on their audience, and
encode information about
external events in their calls [4].
Tracing the evolution of
language requires clarifying the
nature of continuities between
human and nonhuman cognitive
structures and communication
systems in order to specify likely
pathways by which language’s
unique features could have
emerged [5]. One intriguing
research area, explored by
Slocombe and Zuberbühler [6] in a
recent issue of Current Biology,
concerns the possibility that some
animal signals refer to objects or
events external to the signaler, and
may therefore be similar to words.
The first evidence of such
referential potential came from the
observation that wild vervet
monkeys (Cercopithecus aethiops)
produce acoustically distinct alarm
calls in response to their three
most important predators —
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Although unique in important ways, language shares some properties
with other animal communication systems. Comparative analyses of
nonhuman primate vocalizations can shed light on the evolution of
language’s special features.
eagles, leopards and snakes —
and that listeners respond
differently to each [7].
Broadcasting recordings of these
calls in the absence of actual
predators elicits the same
behavioral responses from
listeners as the predators
themselves, suggesting that the
vocalizations in some way ‘stand
for’ the predators [8]. Similar
observations have been made for
the alarm calls of ring-tailed lemurs
(Lemur catta) [9], Diana and
Campbell’s monkeys (C. diana, C.
campbelli) [10], and domestic
chickens (Gallus gallus) [11].
There are, however, important
ways in which such calls differ
from human words. Human words
are built according to
phonological rules from a finite
number of sound contrasts
characteristic of a given language
community [12]. The consequence
of this structural property,
whereby meaningless units are
combined into meaningful ones, is
that languages contain a vast
number of words. By contrast,
vocal repertoires in animals are
limited to a few dozen calls, and
evidence for phonological rules is
scarce [13]. In addition, unlike the
alarm calls of some primate
species, a large percentage of
words refer to concepts rather
than physical entities, or have no
referents at all, functioning
instead as grammatical items
(articles, prepositions and so
forth). Finally, there are
substantial philosophical and
empirical obstacles to specifying
what animal vocalizations might
mean to signalers and receivers,
and thus how similar they could
be cognitively to human words.
For example, does hearing a
leopard alarm call produce a
mental picture of a leopard in the
vervet listener, or simply an
escape routine [14]?
In recognition of the fact that
animal signals cannot be the
same as words, the term
‘functionally referential’ was
coined to characterize those calls
that appear ‘to encode sufficient
information about referent
characteristics to allow
conspecific receivers to respond




specificity (a call is always
associated with the same
stimulus), and high response
specificity in the absence of other
cues (listener responses to
playbacks match responses to
referents) [16]. The empirical
demonstration of functional
reference is most compelling
when the vocalizations under
consideration are from different
call types, rather than being
variants of the same vocalization,
and when listener responses differ
in kind rather than in degree.
When these conditions are met, it
is more likely that the motivational
component of calls, which can
operate as a contextual cue to
supplement the referential
component of signals, can be
experimentally controlled [15].
As they reported in Current
Biology last month, Slocombe and
Zuberbühler [6] conducted
experimental playbacks of
chimpanzee food calls to a
captive chimpanzee in order to
examine the referential potential
of these calls (Figure 1). Many
animals and birds are known to
produce specific vocalizations
upon discovery of food, and
experimental studies have
suggested that some of these
signals meet the criteria of
functional reference [17]. Wild
chimpanzees produce one type of
call, the ‘rough grunt,’ upon
discovering food and in no other
contexts, thus fulfilling the
requirement of production
specificity [18]. Experimental
studies have shown that the rate
of rough grunting depends on the
amount and divisibility of food
present [19]. Field workers have
noted that rough grunts are
acoustically variable, especially in
being relatively high or low
pitched, but field observations
have not revealed differences in
food quality or quantity
associated with this acoustic
variability. Instead, acoustic
differences have been associated
with social context [20]. Thus,
suggestions of functional
reference for this call have been
restricted to food discovery in
general. 
Based on acoustic analyses of
82 calls delivered in 19 bouts,
Slocombe and Zuberbühler [6]
were able to distinguish two rough
grunt variants produced by three
captive chimpanzees: a higher
pitched one given to a preferred
food type, and a lower pitched
noisier one given to a less prized
food. The chimpanzees were
habituated to two feeding
stations, a tree baited with the
preferred food and a tree baited
with the less desirable food.
Experimental playbacks (17 tests
Dispatch    
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Figure 1. Liberius, the juvenile male chimpanzee tested with food grunt playbacks [6].
Photograph courtesy of Katie Slocombe.
and 10 controls) of the two rough
grunt variants elicited differential
searching behavior by a juvenile
male. In four of the six initial trials,
this male first searched the tree
containing the food
corresponding to the playback
stimulus. In the 11 remaining
trials, the male searched the tree
with the preferred food first
irrespective of playback stimulus,
but searched more intensively
after hearing grunts given to the
preferred food. The authors
conclude that the two rough
grunts meet the criteria of
functional reference, containing
sufficient information about the
nature of food sources to guide
their subject’s searching behavior.
This conclusion goes beyond
previous suggestions of functional
reference for chimpanzee rough
grunts in claiming not just that the
rough grunt is functionally
referential in general, but that
different rough grunt variants refer
to different foods or food
preferences.
Although the demonstration of
functional reference in a
chimpanzee vocalization would
be an important contribution to
language origins research,
Slocombe and Zuberbühler’s [6]
findings should be viewed with
considerable caution for several
reasons. First, responses to the
playbacks were not sharply
differentiated (low response
specificity, unlike monkey
responses to alarm calls), a
problem also encountered in the
analysis of rhesus monkey food
calls [17]. Second, the authors
were unable to control for
individual, age, and sex
differences in call structure. Field
analyses have indicated that
younger individuals give higher
pitched rough grunts [20]. In this
study, a subadult male and adult
female contributed 6 of 9 bouts to
the preferred food, but only 5 of
10 bouts to the less preferred
food. Moreover, it is unclear what
effect social context had on call
production. Again, field analyses
have indicated that social
excitement affects call structure
[20]. Since the hypothesized
referential signals are variants of
the same call type, it is therefore
difficult to evaluate the
contribution of motivational state
as a contextual cue embedded in
the vocal playback [15]. Taken
together, these ambiguities mean
that production specificity, like
response specificity, has not
been clearly demonstrated.
Larger sample sizes of both
callers and test subjects are
needed to disentangle the
possible sources of variation in
rough grunt acoustic structure
and to isolate their effects on
listeners.
Despite these shortcomings,
this first attempt to test for
functional reference in a
chimpanzee vocalization should
stimulate further research. Efforts
in captivity can profit from the
opportunity to manipulate key
aspects of social context and
motivational state in both
senders and receivers. Renewed
attention to food calling in the
wild can help specify its
functional significance. Tracing
the evolution of language will
always be hampered by the fact
that early hominid species that
likely possessed proto-linguistic
abilities are extinct. Nevertheless,
it is a fair hypothesis that at least
some of the substrate on which
language is founded can be
explored through comparative
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